The Honduran government and the maras (criminal street gangs) have sparred with each other since the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 gangs solidified their bases in the early 2000s. About ten years earlier, in the 1990s, the massive deportations of thousands of gang members from Los Angeles, California, to their places of origins in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, would set the stage for a major conflict that some Central American veterans compare to the past armed conflicts (e.g., Guatemala, 1960-96; El Salvador, 1980-91), or worst. Unlike Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Hondurans dodged the armed conflict or civil war “bullet,” but the astronomical number of lives lost as a result of the continuing violence, especially amongst the youth, is tragic and abominable. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador’s homicide rates have been ranked consistently as the highest in Latin America and even the world. In the peak year of 2011-12, Honduras was on top with 90 homicides per 100,000. Although the current 2017 rate is reported at around 40 homicides per 100,000, the violence has remained flagrant in the number and the manner by which homicides are committed, and where whole families are affected in one way or another. (Countries like the United States have a homicide rate of around 5 percent per 100,000 people.)

            We know much more today than a decade ago about how the maras live and function as criminal entities. Investigative journalists, writers, photographers, artists, documentary film producers and writers, and social scientists and researchers have contributed diligently to a body of work that is extraordinary and revealing, yet, disturbing against the background of a complicated social problem of enormous proportions. The documentary film by Christian Poveda, La vida loca (2008), reveals the strange world of MS-13 (in El Salvador) that requires serious reflection and thought about how much we really understand life; InSight Crime (and the Asociación para un sociedad más justa) investigative reports (2016) open our eyes to the facts and reality of the pain and suffering among the victims and their families caused by gang violence. Social scientist investigations have compiled and organized invaluable information, such as Cantor’s article, “The New Wave: Forced Displacement Caused by Organized Crime in Central America and México” (2014), and the prolific work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Honduras” (2016). Finally, the Human Rights country reports are essential in their reporting of lesser known but significant violations against gang members committed by government and private agencies. 

            To the question of winning or losing the war, it’s important to analyze the case through a broad historical lens to understand how and why the problem of gang violence escalated so intensely. By the time the United States began the massive deportation of young males charged with criminal activity and presumably, were members of street gangs in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the first Barrio 18 gang was well established in the El Pedregal sector in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa. Dozens of other smaller street gangs worked the streets as deliquents in urban areas but most of their activity was petty and non-violent. The criminal, violent element of gang activity was brought to fruition by the hardened gang members of Barrio 18 and in 1991, the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, specifically, in the Bella Vista colonia in Comayagüela part of the Honduran capital. The national newspaper, El Heraldo, recently published a multi-media piece (“Viviendo entre las maras”) on the evolution of the two major criminal street gangs, pointing out that by 2002, the smaller street gangs in the major cities had been co-opted or pushed out by either Barrio 18 or MS-13. The two dominant criminal gangs brought experience and know-how from their rank and file while in Los Angeles, California, and then, during their incarceration period, until they were deported. 

            The statistical data (2011) from the Department of Homeland Security indicates that within a nine-year period, 2001-2010, about 117,000 imprisoned gang members were deported, for whom their immigration entry into the United States was illegal, and they had been convicted and sentenced for their crimes. Specifically, 13,000 prisoners were deported to El Salvador, 17,000 were deported to Honduras, and 21,000 to Guatemala. These young male gang members immediately proceeded to their respective home bases which had continuously expanded quite formidably beyond their starting points of El Pedregal and Bella Vista in Tegucigalpa. Clearly, the receiving countries were unprepared to transition and integrate the deportees into society.

            The social landscape in the urban areas of Honduras propelled the newly deported gang members into a survival mode which led them to consolidate and strengthen their gang membership. Employment opportunities were non-existent since the high rate of unemployment was dismal, and even though the rates hovered around 7 percent in 2002, 10.5 percent in 2004, and 9 percent in 2014, the numbers indicate employment for individuals that were looking for work, thus, excluding the majority of gang members since they refused to even register for possible employment. The country has a 65 percent poverty rate and a third of those employed are ‘underemployed.’ And, due to the encroachment of agribusiness and climate change, many families from the countryside gave up their farms and began migrating to the urban areas. Once their criminal activities landed them in prisons, the gang leaders realized a need to re-organize themselves. There were so many members incarcerated, and the prisons became seriously unhealthy and overcrowded. They needed money to hire lawyers, and they reached out to their base members outside the prison, a turn of events that had a huge impact on their modus operandi. Extortion became the life line for collecting money for imprisoned gang members, and then, for themselves. 

            The criminal street gang members live and die by their own rules. Their rebelliousness is manifested in the way they choose to live; free to act, speak, and treat others as they wish. Some of their rules are etched in stone, such as “respect the barrio,” or “ver, oír, callar,” (“see, hear, stay silent”) but various and capricious interpretations and exceptions are allowable. Some women (and children) play the worst and least important roles, usually as silent actors ordered to perform menial and dangerous tasks. Sometimes, the wife or daughter of a gang member is assassinated in retaliation for what the husband did or didn’t do as part of the gang’s rule. They live in poverty with money stolen from others; they live in the present as if there’s no future, and perhaps, there isn’t a future outlook in their worldview. They ruthlessly kill (or torture and kill) individuals or entire families who refuse to comply with their demands, regardless of who they were, whether they were family members or friends. Numerous, regular gun battles between and among the rival gangs, and the shoot-outs with police result in intended and unintended killings. In 2018 the homicide rate is at 40 percent, almost half from seven years ago, but which is still beyond the normal acceptable range. It is estimated that 1.8 millions guns are in circulation and only a fraction (around 600,000) are legally registered. Fear permeates throughout every part of society affected by gang violence: gang members are afraid of police; police are afraid of gangs, and people in the community live in constant fear that their children will be killed or recruited by the gangs, and they fear for their lives. Even if they move away from the affected areas, they fear for the family or friends they left behind. 

            The Honduran government’s response or solution to the violence and crime committed by the maras has been consistent and systematic. Clearly, their actions indicate their desire to end the problem as quickly and cost-effective as possible. The first step was to incarcerate the gang members and provide assurance to their constituents that the problem had disappeared. But they had to build enough prisons to house the continuously growing numbers of prisoners. Placing gang members in a mixed gang environment resulted in members killing each other’s rivals. So, the prisons were segregated by gang affiliation, which allowed them to establish their prison headquarters, and thus, organize and order criminal activities to be executed by their gang members in their territories.

            In 2010, the Honduran government began to deploy the military to the gang hotspots, engaging gang members in shoot-outs, allowing families with young children to witness or be part of the killings. This was part of the “iron fist” (“mano dura”) policy adopted by the government. In 2013 the Public Order Military Force (Policia Militar de Orden Público – PMOP) took control of enforcing the law in gang territories. Another elite military police unit trained by the United States, TIGERS, was also deployed into gang-controlled areas. Various reports point to the human rights violations committed by the military-style officers. Reports surfaced of extrajudicial killings as well as death squads and vigilante group attacks in gang territories. Between 2010 and 2013, the United Nation reported about 150 complaints of squad-style killings in Tegucigalpa and 50 complaints in the San Pedro Sula area, all of them executed by the government military.  Some members of the police enforcement, including the PMOP units, were reportedly charged with extortion and kidnapping of non-gang members within the local population. Private security guards hired by wealthy families were also part of the overall defense that identified the gang members as the common enemy. Among the approximately 70,000 armed private security guards in Honduras (double the amount of police officers in the country), the majority are unregistered with the government. 

            While the government flexed its military-style muscle against the maras, the response by the gang leaders followed quickly. For example: members of the enforcement units (police officers) were assassinated by gang members; gang territories were doubly secured so that everyone leaving and entering the territory was thoroughly checked; some of the entry/exit points became checkpoints to collect extortion money; gang members expanded their territories; families who resisted were pushed out and their houses became the property of the gangs; gangs did not allow some children to attend school; and some teachers were demanded to pay the extortion fees. The maras recruited more youngsters to work as look-outs and to carry informative messages through rival gang territory so they wouldn’t be caught off-guard when the PMOP set out to conduct surprise raids to kill or arrest them. And, of course, they continued to execute the “traitors.” (See “Honduras: Displaced People at ‘State of Emergency’ Levels.”)

            The government attempted yet another strategy to stop the maras: by passing laws. Between 2003-2005, the government started using the Anti-gang Law (Ley Antimaras, Article 332 of Penal Code) to arrest young males whom they suspected of being gang members, mostly because of their tattoos. The maras changed their rule of identifying themselves with ink and as of late, gang members are hardly recognizable since they dress like non-gang members. In 2015, the government passed a law penalizing gang leaders with fifty years of prison time. The maras maintain an organizational structure that identifies the leaders as “toros” or “palabreros,” who are serving prison time. Beyond the leadership, the maras vary in their hierarchical organization: some gang cells are more autonomous or independent than others. The traditional “leader” serving time in prison has become more of a figurehead, and quite possibly to ensconce the “leaders,” the actual gang members giving orders to commit criminal activities, thus, evading capture and arrest as leaders of the maras.  In 2015, a law was passed to increase the punishment against the gang members arrested for extortion, which was now defined as an “act of terrorism.” Perhaps, this may be the reason why the maras extortion methods changed, from demanding small amounts of money to exorbitant, one-time payments. Also, women in the maras have played a greater role in collecting extortion money, which may be another way for the male members to avoid capture and arrest. 

            In 2017, the Honduran president, Juan Orlando Hernández, announced that he had ordered the transfer of 2,000 prisoners, mostly gang members labeled as “the most dangerous prisoners,” to a newly built prison, EL Pozo II in Morocelí, in the department of El Paraíso. This was yet another transfer of prisoners to locations that were isolated and meant to curtail communication with their fellow gang members on the outside. Prior to the announcement, in another prison, El Centro Penitenciario de Tamara, 18 gang members from Barrio 18 escaped and since then, only four have been captured. Reportedly, the gang had paid millions in bribes to prison guards and administrators so they could walk out the front door.  

            The government authorities’ and maras’ games of “cat and mouse’ have not only failed to solve the problems, but served to worsen the conditions for the people, especially the poor, marginalized, and the most vulnerable – women, children, the elderly- that have been denied any semblance of protection. Thousands of people, especially in the urban areas, have been internally displaced due to the criminality of the maras and the lack of protection from the government. But, it appears that people can’t escape the violence, the ubiquitous fear, the absence of protection for themselves and their families, and their cry and clamor for help fall on deaf ears. 

History has a way of repeating itself, at least in some ways.

What the wealthy oligarchs did to the masses in robbing their lands, starving the poor, using their power against them to gain more prestige and wealth, killing those that stand in their way – basically denying the working people of the dignity they deserve  – has an uncanny resemblance to what the maras are doing to the communities that they control: they steal money and property from hard-working families, they murder those that stand in their way; they make up rules that benefit them, they bribe others to get their way. To many people in Honduras, the problem with the maras represent yet another form of corruption that has plagued the country for generations. 

How do you fix something when you can’t go back in time and change the chain of events? 

See Sonia Nazario’s article, “Pay or Die,” on the maras domination and corruption at the governmental levels.

The story of the consequences of replacing farming with cattle raising couldn’t have a more tragic and devastating impact on the peasant farmers and the environment than it did in Honduras, especially in Southern Honduras where agriculture is the reigning source of livelihood. 

The destruction based on human error is one of the most important narratives in the National Research Council book chapter: “Honduras: Population, Inequality and Resource Destruction.”  Poor decisions were made throughout the entire process of transforming the farming agricultural culture into a cattle industry, which could have been prevented, but unfortunately, and as a result, according to the experts the damages are irreversible. 

Reallocation of Land

Landowners cultivated cotton and grain, and peasant farmers cultivated their meager crops (e.g., maize, beans, sorghum) wherever they could mete out a piece of land. But landowners faced several events for which they had to make investment decisions: economically, agricultural commodity prices were not profitable enough; labor costs were proportionately too high; and rain was becoming scarce. However, they seized on the popularity of investing in livestock at the international and national levels and turned the fertile lands into pasture. Unfortunately, the farmers were cut off twice by the landowners: they lost their jobs as field workers, and their plots of land used to feed their families. Presumably, the big winners were the landowners for whom these livestock programs were like winning the lottery.   

The World Bank for agriculture and rural development in Central America brought loan funds that expanded the cattle industry. Between 1960 and 1983, 57 percent of the loan funds went to the landowners for their cattle businesses, and at the same the devastation on the environment began to take its toll. 

A Crack in the Delicate Balance  

Southern Honduras has the most fertile land in the country and its inhabitants depend on agriculture, not only for putting food on their tables, but as the bread basket for the regions. Over 80 percent of the Honduras is mountainous and 70 percent of its population depend on agriculture. Thus, any change in the reallocation of the land has an immediate impact on the population and the country’s economy. In the 1970s, 68 percent of Honduras was owned by 20 percent of the population. The gap of social and economic inequality widened as the rich became wealthier and the poor remained in a debilitating suppression for which generations of families have never recovered.    

Wealthy landowners took an aggressive stance against the peasant farmers and systematically forced them out of their lands, using unethical and even, illegal tactics, forcing the inhabitants to give up their ancestral landholdings. Then, peasant farmers had to submit to an onerous agreement whereby the owners would lease the land to them, pay an inordinate amount of rent each year, and when they couldn’t afford it, they were evicted. The farmers were forced to leave their lands as livestock production increased in the lowlands and the highlands. The Hondurans and Salvadorans became adversaries as they competed for the cultivable land that seemed to be gradually disappearing.     

Shrimp Farming Opens Up More Social Wounds

Honduran investors added two more new export crops, cantaloupe and shrimp, to counter the decline in beef prices and its demand. But the big business in shrimp farming also means big problems. In the Golf of Fonseca, where the shrimp industry has grown exponentially since 1982, high levels of DDT pesticide have been detected in the shrimp larvae. Clearly, the runoff of pesticides is affecting not only drinking water but it threatens the health of many people, especially considering that the shrimp is an export product. 

The areas where shrimp farms have expanded were once public lands where locals made their livelihood by fishing and hunting. Like the farmers that were displaced due to livestock production, the poor families along the waterways were similarly forced to leave their homes. The investors fenced out the locals, hired armed guards to keep them away, and designated beach areas as private property. Recently, community leaders have been assassinated in their attempts to fend off encroachment of wealthy investors that threaten their means of survival. One such leader was Berta Cáceres.  

Berta Cáceres, a Honduran environmental activist and human rights defender, was assassinated in 2016 by persons associated with the development of hydroelectric projects that threatened the lives and livelihoods of inhabitants, mostly the indigenous communities. The case against her assassins and masterminds has not been completely resolved, but the movement that she led has been strengthened nationally and internationally, bringing attention to the corruption and greed of the Honduran government and foreign investors.

See next article: The Destructive Path of Oligopoly.

  Hondurans have rights, just not very many.

According to a report by the World Bank Group titled, “Modernizing the Water and Sanitation Sector Builds Resilience,” serious efforts by the Honduran government have resulted in considerable progress in making drinking water accessible to many but not all residents: the excluded and marginalized inhabitants who live in various urban and rural communities. 

Prior to the passing of the law in 2003, called Ley Marco, the Honduran residents in the municipalities that had access to drinking water enjoyed it for a few hours a week, some as much as three days a week. The Ley Marco established the mandate to making water more accessible by decentralizing the supply of water and transferring the provider responsibilities to municipal governments. With the assistance of a World Bank loan, the government pushed for the creation of autonomous municipal service providers. During this collaborative effort, the government succeeded in achieving many of its goals within a set timeframe, and finally, residents had considerable more drinking water, up to 24 hours a day in some areas. 

But the project ended in 2016, and many communities such as the one in the video were excluded, and in the final analysis, the government was faulted in several key areas. Ineffectiveness or incompetence amongst the governing entity led to the squandering of financial resources, essential for maintaining and upgrading the equipment, for policy development, and for lack of transparency. Making drinking water accessible to all residents became a political nightmare for local officials who sought to strike a balance between making water accessible to as many as possible and expanding a gratuitous service to the poor that could not afford it. But within the power grab exploits of greedy politicians, those that were excluded, the poor and voiceless, lacked the leverage to hold accountable the responsible parties.

It’s the same ploy used by the government to systematically take away the democratic rights of its people. Case in point: the Honduran educators and health workers are in a power struggle with the government to maintain their right to determine what is in the best interest of teachers and students, and the future of their educational institutions. 

The story of how residents lost their democratic right to make a reasonable demand on their government to make drinking water accessible is a good example of the strategy that the Honduran government and politicians have adopted for the purpose of monopolizing power and silver lining their pockets. The strategy of systematically diminishing the democratic rights and freedoms of the people by a government that practices a weak form of democracy include: maintaining control in decentralization, manipulation of votes and funds, using slush fund allocations to promote their political agenda and play political favorites, and weakening their opponents by lessening their power to hold those responsible accountable for corruption and/or incompetence.      

See next article: The Choluteca River is Drying Up

The means by which wealthy landowners have used to help themselves to the best and most productive resources can only be explained as greed and recklessness, or choosing to wear blinders and ignore the consequences of their actions. The patterns of oligopoly are evident in the exploitation of the land and the people, the decisions to enrich an elite few and impoverish many others, worsening the suffering of those affected, and risking the future of the country. The destruction, whether social or environmental, was an exorbitant price to pay in exchange for making a quick profit. 

Even though Honduras continues to lose its forest resources every year, cattle raising continues to increase. There’s scientific prediction that “the forest resource will be exhausted in a generation.” (USAID Agricultural Sector Profile; also see Honduras Landscape Analysis). 

See next article: Honduras is Losing the War With the Maras.

Both a blessing and a curse: the Río Choluteca, stems from the Hierba Buena Mountain, near the Lepaterique municipality, a Lenca community, and flows through the northern part of Tegucigalpa, then, southward for a total of 217 miles, and finally, disperses into the Golf of Fonseca and the Pacific Ocean.

A steady source of water throughout its history, essential to both urban and rural inhabitants, the Río Choluteca has been affected by climactic changes such as Hurricane Mitch and the drought, whose occurances are more frequent and prolonged. The climate risk factors are major concerns in Honduras, according to the USAID-supported report.

Climate Change 

Río Choluteca’s drought condition is only a small fraction of a larger, more comprehensive consequence associated with climate change that, unless emergency type of measures are enacted, the country will suffer catastrophic consequences. This phenomenon is reported repeatedly by experts in their field. (See “The Climate Change Risk Profile.”)

The impact of climate change has had a continuous effect in variable degrees on agriculture – the soil and the lives of laboring farmers, the fisheries, especially along the coastlines, as well as everything that is inexorably connected to the ecosystems and the health and well-being of the people. 

Honduras, a little larger than the state of Kentucky, is particularly susceptible to climate change threats, and its large rural population of 50 percent relies heavily on rainfall for their crops. Agriculture exports make up 14 percent of the country’s GPD, yet 65 percent of the rural farmers live in poverty. The population is steadily increasing and patterns of migration increasingly flow from rural to urban areas where settlements are established in unhealthy and hazard-prone areas that, like the communities along Río Choluteca, lack water management and sewerage. 

Honduras is known as one of the poorest country in Latin America; the measures of indices reveal a menacing deficiency in educational attainment, employment and income, accessibility to health and social services, but very high in food insecurity (about 60 percent of children suffer from malnutrition), and violence or crimes committed toward men, women, the elderly, and youth; the homicide and femicide rates are amongst the highest in the world. The sharp, social inequality is particularly notable. Whereas climate change is definitely a factor in the overall threat assessment on the environment and the country as a whole, the political aspect of Honduran life, in the past and present, has played an immensely dominant role on the lives of Hondurans in the current generation and its future.   

The Río Choluteca is Contaminated

The use of pesticides by agribusiness owners such as cotton growers have contributed to abnormally high contamination levels in water sources and surrounding soil. In 1981, researchers who conducted studies in the city of Choluteca in southern Honduras, measured levels of poison in food and water supplies and determined that 10 percent of the residents had cases of intoxication. The contaminants they discovered were derived from dichlorodipheny/trichloroethane or DDT, Dieldrin, Toxaphene, and Parathion. (All of these poisons have been banned and/or highly restricted in the United States and other countries because they have been proven to systematically cause death or serious illnesses among adults and children.) 

There’s a growing concern amongst residents that runoff of pesticides have contaminated water sources and the soil that cultivates the food for human consumption. 

See next article: Cattle Industry in Honduras: Investment for an Elite Few.

Abstract*

            Despite the level of determination, Guatemalans have the lowest level of educational attainment in Central America, particularly significant when considering the fact that over half the country’s population is under 18 years of age.  Over half of Guatemalans lives within a measure of poverty, some very extreme, and a majority of the people live within territorial boundaries, in small, medium, and large-sized pueblos, some of these in remote mountain regions, characterized by specific culture, language, politics, and history, to name a few. The educational policy change initiated by the government is challenged because of its disregard to diversity, to the linguistic and cultural uniqueness in each of the 22 ethnic groups. The reform plan includes the elimination of the teacher institution (magisterio) and replaces it with costly, unaffordable university-based designs that remotely address the true nature of the educational problems.

In this research paper we used a contextual framework of social justice, inclusive of historical and political ramifications, to describe and analyze the following: a) the conflict(s) arising from the new government’s change agenda in education; b) the role of the United States in Guatemala’s decision making and policy development; and c) the consequences as the direct result of the government’s changes, especially amongst the diverse indigenous communities.

We framed our study within a comparative perspective and viewed Guatemala not only as part of Central America but also, as an integral member of all Latin America. As such, the scope of our research has broad implications for other countries, including Mexico.

The Time for Change in the Worst of Times

Guatemalans are living in the most challenging of times; some would argue that conditions are just as worst or more so then during the armed conflict between 1960 and 1996 (see Burrell, 2013). Undoubtedly, the country’s most principle need for reform is in the educational system. Even though great strides have been achieved through the sheer determination and persistence of the people, Guatemala has the lowest level of educational attainment in Central America. The government statistics point to 96 percent attendance level of children in primary grades, but this number excludes the 1.5 million children with excessive school absences, mostly due to economic hardships.¹  Dropout rates are exceedingly high and only less than 10 percent of the student population attends the university. The crisis level is alarming when considering the fact that over half the country’s population is under 18 years of age.

Reform Efforts

At the heart of the current political struggle that pits community and students against the government is in the training of teachers. Many arguments point to the need for improvement and change in the preparation of teachers as the most important strategy that may positively impact educational achievement. Students pursuing their preparation in teacher training colleges, called Escuelas Normales, and the communities that support them, have embarked in an intense campaign to repudiate the proposal from the Minister of Education to eliminate the current gratuitous programs and replace them with costly university-based designs that don’t even address the true nature of the educational problems. The students attending Escuelas Normales, or Normalistas, object to the proposal for many reasons and they have been vocally opposing these measures for almost a year.  Still, to date, the Ministry of Education has refused to engage in substantive dialogue with the students and other stakeholders.

Research Method

In this research paper we used a contextual framework of social justice, inclusive of historical and political ramifications, to describe and analyze the conflict(s) arising from the new government’s change agenda in education; the role of the United States in Guatemala’s decision making and policy development and the motivating factors; and the consequences as the direct result of the government’s changes, especially amongst the indigenous communities. Most of our work was completed in the field, and was based on anthropological perspectives of maintaining objectivity while collecting data using qualitative modes of inquiry: Our fieldwork took place in a community in the city of  K’iché (in the highlands of Guatemala in the Department of Quiche) for six weeks in the Fall of 2012. The collection of data included photos, field notes, interviews with formal and informal protocols, transcripts and notes of the interviews conducted with various members of the community; archival data from internet sources, including official government web sites and other various sites such as the USAID and Ministry of Education; social media sources, including blogs, newsletters, and other news sources. Also included were interviews with community leaders, organizers; photos of community members in action, such as in school and in home and meetings; videos of community members in action; and published research studies. One member of our team served as a volunteer/participant observer for four weeks in a community school.

We used “documentation’ from all of the sources to focus on the lead questions. The “narrative” emerged to provide us with insights into contextual environment inclusive of various social, cultural, economic, and political factors, which then led to the development of  “discussion queries,” by which we drew analysis and eventually, conclusions. Triangulation of the data was used in every way possible to divert from a unilateral perspective or biasness.

What is the Ministry of Education’s Proposal?

Prerequisite to understanding the content and implications of the Ministry of Education’s (MINEDUC) proposal are some vital facts. In Guatemala’s educational system students first complete six years of their compulsory primary education, then continue to Ciclo Prevocacional or Middle School for three years.  Students that follow the carrera magisterial to become primary teachers continue to Secondary Education, Ciclo Diversificado or Diversified Secondary for two years. At Tertiary Education stage, students complete three years of study at a teacher training college or Escuela Normal, which allows them to teach at a primary school. To receive the title of “professor” students must complete an additional three-year program at a university. A four-year university program leads to a Baccalaureate in Arts and Science.²

The pathway to the formation of teachers is as important as the physical, geopolitical, economic, and demographic landscape of the country in understanding the tensions and conflicts behind the peaceful resistance and demands of the students and their supporters (see Arnove, 2005). Over half of the country lives within a measure of poverty, some very extreme, and a majority of the people live within territorial boundaries, in small and large-sized pueblos, some of these in remote mountain regions, characterized by specific culture, language, politics, and history, to name a few. Thus, diversity, with all its amplifications, is a major factor that underlies every aspect of the proposal and rebuttal.

The main points in the MINEDUC proposal are:

•  Eliminate the “magisterio,” which essentially means to change radically the current system of preparing primary school teachers.
• Replace the “magisterial” system of preparing teachers with a university program that requires students to complete a Bachillerato en Ciencias y Letras. So in essence, students must enroll and complete a three-year university program in order to qualify for the title of “professor.”
• To implement a teacher training program for pre-primary teachers in the Escuelas Normales, public or private.  Technical assistance is programmed for this program and for the Bachillerato en Ciencas y Letras.
•  To seek incentives to increase the salary of graduates from the proposed program wherever they are hired to teach.
• To provide scholarships (in 2015) for graduates of the proposed program to continue their studies (as post-graduates) in private or public universities (the only public university is University of San Carlos).
• To offer courses in conjunction with the Bachillerato in Ciencias y Letras that includes agroforestal (forestry), turismo (tourism), and textiles, among others.

Normalistas’ Response

Several key points in the Normlistas’ rebuttal are valid in the sense that they posit realistic concerns that challenge MINEDUC to provide a response accordingly:

• The proposal does not address how the proposed changes will purportedly impact positively the quality of education on a short and long-term basis. There’s no information that addresses the improvement levels at the university-based programs, in fact, the Normalista’s rebuttal asks who will be in charge of their program at the university level where resources are scarces and irrelevant to the needs of the educational programs in the pueblos and rural communities.
• Eliminating the magisterial and requiring students to complete university programs translates to an economic burden on behalf of the students and their families. The MINEDUC proposal includes the participation of the universities, however, the only public university that doesn’t charge tuition is University of San Carlos (USAC); the other eight or nine are private universities that require students to pay tuition. The Normalistas are concerned that USAC lacks sufficiently the capacity and resources so that most of the Normalistas will have to attend a costly university program. This point underscores their secondary concern that MINEDUC’s proposed changes are meant to enrich the private universities, or to put it in another way, it is a strategy to privatize teacher education.  Additionally, the proposal doesn’t address how the universities will effectively improve teacher training.
• There is no guarantee that the proposed changes will lead to an increase in salaries for the graduates.
• The scholarships proposed by MINEDU are not meant for the students beginning their training. These are proposed for graduates as post-graduate scholarships that are clearly meant for private universities. Again, this is a clear instance validating the Normalistas’ claim that the proposal is focused on the privatization of the professional training of teachers.
• The proposed changes undoubtedly reduce the opportunities for students to pursue a teacher credential. Presently, less than 1 percent of the indigenous student population attends the university. But besides that, the proposed changes lack credibility in demonstrating how these changes will improve education, not only for the teachers-in-training, but for the school children as well, on a short and long-term basis.

Bilingual Intercultural Education

The loss of the magisterial will drastically change the Bilingual Intercultural Education programs. The Normalistas are proud of the fact that the 18 Escuelas Normales in the country train teachers to help students become bilingual in Spanish and one of the four language groups: K’iche, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi, and Mam. Their concern is that a university-based program does not have the capacity or resources to carry out the programs in an effective manner. The community support garnered through these programs is immeasurable and closing the magisterial will inadvertently cause problems of maintaining the engagement by the communities. In this light, the Normalistas’s claim that their rights to their language and culture in an educational setting will be violated is a valid one. The Bilingual Intercultural Education Program is described in the MINEDU’s website.³

The Role of the United States in Guatemala’s Neoliberal Politics

In 2009, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) distributed funds to Guatemala’s governmental agencies that totaled 32.1 million dollars.⁴ Funds earmarked for Education and Social Services were 5.9 million, for which 5.5 million were specifically for Basic Education and $400,000 for Higher Education.  Guatemala’s Ministry of Education has a website specifically dedicated to USAID’s educational program, Reforma Educativa en el Aula,⁵ that include broad educational goals for the time frame 2009-2013. While USAID and the Guatemala MINEDU’s educational goals are similar, a pronounced difference exists as listed below:

Similar Goals:

o   To strengthen the capacity of institutions.

o   To improve instruction in the classroom.

o   To promote access to quality education to underserved populations, women, and Mayan groups.

o   To provide strategies for parents, communities, and leaders to participate actively in education of students.

Difference in Goals:

o   MINEDUC – To increase effectiveness or improve teacher training (“prácticas docentes”).

USAID does not specify a goal toward teacher training improvement but does mention in the needs statement that the lack of educational attainment by students is due to “poor teacher training.” If MINEDUC subsumes this goal as an objective in conjunction with the goal, To strengthen the capacity of institutions, there is no mention of this in their related statements. Furthermore, it’s questionable whether eliminating the “magistrial” is keen to strengthening the capacity of institutions.

However, to understand the underlying motives for the goals and objectives stated by both the United States’ USAID agency and Guatemala’s MINEDUC it’s necessary to analyze the philosophical differences and historical facts that shed light on a broader perspective of the problematic issues.

USAID History and Politics

USAID was launched during President Kennedy’s administration in 1961.⁶  Since then, its evolution has resulted in the distribution of foreign aide to hundreds of countries and in the creation of partnerships with corporations and non-profit organizations. Currently, they have personnel in 100 countries including Guatemala and El Salvador in Central America. According to the agency, one of their most successful strategies is partnering with more corporations that have increased their funding levels. The overall goal of USAID has not changed in the 50 years of its existence.

USAID’s Goal: Furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while also extending a helping hand to people.

USAID’s Goal in conjunction with Guatemala: Guatemala has the potential to become Central America’s largest economy and United States leading partner.

The Results and Accomplishments stated by the USAID offer insight into their perceptions and expectations of Guatemala and can be interpreted as incentives or rewards for future funding.  According to their statements, Guatemala’s MINEDUC has achieved success in the following areas:⁷

• The MINEDUC has the support of the educational communities for the K-9 national education content standards.
• MINEDUC has implemented an innovative standardized test in Spanish and in nine Mayan languages to hire and place teachers.
• MINEDUC has made strides in addressing transparency and efficiency in the Ministry of Education that resulted in an international certification system for management in 2007.
• MINEDUC has developed a Municipal Education Progress Index, i.e., the use of data spreadsheets to analyze and compare school operations against student achievement levels, or what we know as accountability system.
• MINEDUC has assessed and produced a list of basic competencies for secondary students (grades 9^th to 12^th) that are needed to be competitive in the labor markets.

Additionally, USAID and its corporate partnerships claim success with MINEDUC that has resulted in over 51,825 scholarships, outreach programs for at least 300 at-risk youths.  However, this information has not been verified with MINEDUC.

USAID’s funding level for Guatemala in education, health, and nutrition activities has totaled 10 million dollars according to their website’s information. This information lacks verification as well.

Analysis

Whether MINEDUC uses the leverage from USAID’s funding to substantiate their political strategies under the banner of Reform is open for interpretation.  However, by accepting USAID’s funds, MINEDUC has the responsibility to comply with the funding requirements. Clearly, USAID’s motive behind the funding distribution is to garner the support of the Guatemalan government to accelerate the country’s efforts toward economic recovery that would be beneficial and profitable to the United States. The educational practices noted in the Results and Accomplishments list are squarely aligned with the United States educational model that privileges a capitalistic approach or a market-led reform of education for economic gains. It’s well noted in Latin American history that the tension between capitalism and socialism is heightened during economically stressful periods (Arnove, 2005). If the United States and Guatemala work together in reforming the country’s educational system, then this collaboration can be viewed as an influential strategy by both countries to steer Guatemala away from socialistic reforms, even though capitalism is not a viable solution for a country with enormous, complex economic issues. A free market economy inherent in a market-led reform would best serve the interests of the wealthy in a country like Guatemala. Thus, what appears to be an educational reform model that purportedly will lift the country out of economic turmoil and succeed in improving the educational system is more like a roadmap toward disaster.

Historical and Political Background on the Minister of Education

When Guatemala’s president, Otto Pérez Molina took office on January 14, 2012, his vision of change for the education system in a country of over 11 million people, was firmly rooted in a far-reaching plan that embraced notions of economic globalism. He wanted a fearless Minister of Education that shared his passion for an “all or nothing” educational reform that would catapult the country into the international global arena, and he’d receive the accolades from world leaders for his efforts in transforming Guatemala. He found the person in Cynthia del Aguila, educated in the United States, a former professor at Guatemala’s private Universidad del Valle, and in her early career had held different positions at the Ministry of Education in Guatemala. At the time that del Aguila was appointed she was employed with the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International based in North Carolina in the United States and had worked there for seven years as an educational manager. At RTI, her main responsibility was with a United States agency called Allianzas, which was devoted to forging partnerships with the private sectors in Guatemala. In del Aguila’s reform plan the solution was quite simple: eliminate the Magisterio, the current training college system consisting of Escuelas Normales, and the Normalistas will have to attend the private universities, thus creating governmental partnerships with private institutions of higher learning. But students, parents, community leaders, and supporters have steadfastly repudiated the reform agenda, and for almost 12 months after del Aguila unveiled the plan they have organized and participated in non-violent protests, sit-ins inside and outside facilities, marches, rallies, and used the social media to their advantage.  Police have used tear gas and arrested protesting students. The embattled del Aguila refuses to concede defeat for doing so may cost her the job as Minister of Education.

Acción de Amparo

On February 25^, 2013, the latest legal action taken against the Ministry of Education, called the Acción de Amparo, was submitted by the Consejo Nacional Permanente de la Reforma Educativa, the social leadership organization representing the Magisterio. In this document, the Consejo asks the court for a legal proceeding that will order MINEDUC not to eliminate the Magisterio. ⁸ The document, Acción de Amparo⁹ makes reference to the key role of the Consejo Nacional in the decision-making process as stipulated in Article 12 of the Ley de Educación Nacional¹⁰, and that MINEDUC overstepped its authority, a violation of human rights, when it disregarded the required proceedings and approval of the reform plan by the Consejo. The Corte Suprema  de Justicia (Justice Supreme Court) must decide on the Acción, whether to halt or allow the reform to continue as initiated by the MINEDUC, although the MINEDUC can appeal the decision against it. This was the case the first time the Acción de Amparo was submitted against MINEDUC in November of 2012.

The Corte Suprema de Justicia granted approval for the first temporary Acción de Amparo but as reported on November 27^th by Prensa Libre.¹¹ Del Aguila announced that the Ministry would appeal the court’s decision. Del Aguila’s comments alluded to her conclusion that since the previous agreement on the magisterial teaching careers had expired in 2011, the MINEDUC had followed appropriate steps to include a process of feedback and input from the institutes and colleges on the new program for teacher training. Del Aguila emphasized that the MINEDUC has every authority to make decisions on how to train teachers as well dispense decisions regarding the careers of teachers. Furthermore, she added that it is the MINEDUC’s responsibility to renew programs that have expired under its authority.

But less than two weeks later, in response to an appeal filed by MINEDUC the Corte Suprema de Justicia reversed its decision, revoking the Amparo on the basis that it lacked sufficient substance. Speculation was raised on whether the MINEDUC’s move to enter a counter legal action in case it lost its appeal was influential in the Corte’s decision to overturn the Acción.¹²

The MINEDUC maintains its authority as the supreme entity that has the sole responsibility and right to make decisions on which reform plan to institute without regard to the democratic participation of stakeholders, even when such inclusion is stipulated in national proclamations. Pres. Pérez Molina has not publicly commented on del Aguila’s hard line posturing of MINEDUC’s authority. His silence may well be interpreted as an unequivocal approval of the actions of his appointed Minister of Education.

Charges of Racism and Discrimination

While MINEDUC maintains its course toward full implementation of the reform agenda, communities such as the Pueblo Xinka have charged the Ministry with racism and discrimination. ¹³ The Pueblo Xinka consists of 400,000 people from three departamentos (states) in southwestern region of Guatemala bordering El Salvador. The parliamentary board of Xinka has formally complained that their requests to the MINEDUC for teaching positions in their Xinka/Spanish Bilingual Intercultural Education program have been ignored. They have waited for a response since 2011, despite the fact that since its initial start four years ago, 60 bilingual students from the Escuelas Normales have successfully completed their training and 300 more Normalistas are enrolled in the program.  They claim that their educational rights as a Pueblo inherent in the national proclamations including the constitution protect their language and culture in the school curriculum.  The fact that MINEDUC has refused to support them is an affirmation of the agency’s deliberate negation of their rights. MINEDUC’s proposed reform agenda would eliminate the Escuelas Normales that have educated the students like those in the Pueblo Xinka, and accordingly, eliminate or reduce the quality of Bilingual Intercultural Education programs.

Decreased Funding Formula and Decentralization

If del Aguila’s plan for decentralization of educational funds is implemented as her announcement has declared, schools will be in total control of their spending for all of their educational needs.¹⁴ In light of the decreased funding formula for primary education, this strategy will cause friction amongst school communities, especially in small pueblos and rural areas that have scarce resources.  Both the decentralization in the funding formula and the MINEDUC’s reform agenda may result in a chaotic landscape of communities fending for their specific educational needs and while some may succeed, those with less funding and other resources will certainly lose.

Analysis

From the outset, Minister del Aguila was determined to accomplish a task for which she had been especially selected. Indeed, overhauling the country’s educational system is akin to rebuilding a county from the ground up. Whether she or President Pérez Molina knew what was at stake and that the complexity of the task would produce a Pandora’s box are difficult to analyze without firsthand knowledge. But, what is clear is that del Aguila didn’t launch a leadership agenda; her priority was and continues to be a task-fulfilling role rather than assuming a leadership in the Ministry of Education. A leader understands fundamentally the role of education in every aspect of society. Experience, perception, insight, and knowledge – all are essential in a leader, but the people of Guatemala want someone that understands them and can bring hope into their lives. Pérez Molina has to assess whether he has chosen the right kind of leader to take charge of probably the most important and challenging social issue of his presidency.

Discussion

The Normalistas are within their right to protest and demand change in all aspects of their teaching profession and in the educational system. They have the support of their constitution, and other official proclamations for their rights. Their community lends support to their demands. But, without the cooperation of MINEDUC, a meaningful, sustainable plan toward improving education that is in the best interest of the Guatemalan people will not be realized.

Historical analyses of educational reforms in contexts of post-war conflicts and economic and social instability have produced a collection of various recommendations and caveats. Consistent with a human rights approach is the common view that, for example, education should be inclusive, relevant, sustainable, and democratic. The community must be engage and have a clear voice in the “public debate” over what constitutes education for all children. Access to education is not sufficient; individuals must be able to overcome economic, social, and cultural barriers. What is clear in Guatemala’s educational reform process is that educational issues are inseparable from the expansive context that includes the legacy of colonialism and social and economic inequalities (Tikly, 2011).

The uphill battle for educational equality is well documented by researchers and noted in the responses by protesting students. The unequal and elitist schooling system in Guatemala’s history is the common story throughout Latin America, including Mexico. But Guatemalans have less access to education in the primary grades than other countries, particularly among the rural poor and girls. The inequality contrasts sharply with the privileged elite that have the resources, political clout, and social mobility that allows them entry into the most competitive sectors of the global society (Reimers, 2000).

Other related research has focused on Lifelong Learning ideals as a basis for an educational reform plan for countries such as Guatemala (Carneiro, 2013). Aligned with this model is that lifelong learning (LLL) both embraces and responds to change. Thus, the curriculum centers on respecting context, history, languages, cultures, and heritage while advocating for empowerment in the citizenry and promoting diverse modes of learning. The democratic citizenship, which is the basic structure founded on the common understanding of human rights, recognizes the value and dignity of all human life. The culture of peace, rejects violence as a controlling mechanism and advocates for democratic negotiations to advance solutions and ideas.

Guatemala’s educational reform process has evoked anger and frustration among teachers, students and families. However, the community responses have been characterized by democratic deals despite the heavy handedness of the country’s administration. Democracy is foremost the modus operandi by its people, clearly an example of the strength and determination of the Guatemalan citizens.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, I include an excerpt from the Diseño Reforma Educativa

Runuk’ik jun K’aka’a Tijonik, (the Educational Reform design) published in 1998. In these introductory paragraphs, the Reform is designated specifically for Guatemala. The main points, translated from the original Spanish text are the following (full text in Spanish found in Appendix A):

• The commission has as its main charge to design an educational system that has the obligation to the Peace Accords, in particular the “Acuerdo sobre Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas,” that grants the rights to the indigenous population to their identity and culture;
• The main goal is to reach common ground that serves as the basis for the national project;
• The process includes the seeking and engaging in the transformation of attitudes that facilitates in a better understanding of others;
• To respect and value the cultural diversity of the country; and
• To attain mutual agreement, dialogue and harmony based on organizational principles of equity and equality.

The question remains: Which is the best road that will lead Guatemala to a better future?  No doubt, the teachers, students and their families carry this enormous responsibility.

Notes

1. For many children in Guatemala, lessons have to be learned in the streets. Article by Jessica Shepherd for the Guardian. Accessed October 24, 2013, from http://www.theguardian.com/education/2011/mar/08/global-campaign-for-education-guatemala.
2. Education system in Guatemala. Accessed October 24, 2013, from http://www.classbase.com/countries/Guatemala/Education-System.
3. Ministry of Education website. Accessed October 24, 20`13, from http://www.mineduc.gob.gt/DIGEBI/.
4. USAID Dollars to Results. Accessed October 24, 2013, from http://results.usaid.gov/guatemala.
5. Reforma Educativa en el Aula. Accessed October 24, 2013 from http://www.reaula.org.
6. USAID History. Accessed October 24, 2013, from http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history.
7. USAID Education. Accessed October 24, 2013, from http://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/education.
8. Otro amparo por reformas a la Carrera magisterial. Article published in Prensa Libre by Hugo Alvarado y Alex Rojas on Feb. 26, 2013. Accessed October 24, 2013 from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/amparo-reformas_0_872912729.html.
9. Accion de amparo. Accessed October 24, 2013, from https://skydrive.live.com/?cid=7bdfe400ca92465c&id=7BDFE400CA92465C%21113&authkey=!AKzUW4fT-pcz6OQ#!/view.aspx?cid=7BDFE400CA92465C&resid=7BDFE400CA92465C%21113&app=WordPdf&authkey=%21AKzUW4fT-pcz6OQ,

10. Ley de Educación Nacional. Accessed October 24, 2013 from http://www.marn.gob.gt/aplicaciones/normas10g/pdf/307.pdf.
11. CSJ suspende temporalmente bachillerato en educación. Article published by Prensa Libre on November 27, 2012. Accessed October 24, 2013 from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Dudas-rodean-magisterio_0_818318175.html?print=1.
12. CC revoca acción contra cambio en Carrera de magisterio. Article by Byron Rolando Vasquez published in Prensa Libre on Dec. 12, 2012. Accessed on October 24, 2013, from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/Revoca-accion-cambio-magisterio_0_827317272.html.
13. Pueblos Xinkas exige educación bilingüe. Article published by CPR-Urbana on Feb. 26, 2013. Accessed on Oct. 24, 2013, from http://cpr-urbana.blogspot.com/2013/02/pueblos-xinkas-exige-educacion-bilingue.html.
14. Déficit de maestros en priprimaria y básicos es del 50%. Article by Prensa Libre published on Feb. 27, 2013. Accessed on Oct. 24, 2013, from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Deficit-maestros-preprimaria-basicos_0_873512856.html.

References

Arnove, R. (2005). Globalisation and public education policies in Latin America:

Challenges to and contributions of teachers and higher education institutions. In J.

Zajda,  International handbook on globalization, education and policy research:

            Global pedagogies and policies, (431-442). Springer: Dordrecht, the Netherlands.

Burrell, J.L. (2013). Maya after war; Conflict, power, and politics in Guatemala. Austin:

University of Texas Press.

Carneiro, R. (2013). Living by learning, learning by living: The quest for meaning.                    International Review of Education: Journal of Lifelong Learning, 59:3, 353-372.

Tikly, L. (2011). Towards a framework for researching the quality of education in low-income countries. Comparative Education, 47:1, 1-23.

Zajda, J. (Ed.). (2005). International handbook on globalization, education and policy

research: Global pedagogies and policies. Springer: Dordrecht, the Netherlands.

Appendix A

La Comisión Paritaria de Reforma Educativa

-COPARE fue constituida por Acuerdo Gubernativo

No. 262-97 de fecha 20 de marzo de 1997,

el cual establece como objetivo de la Comisión:

“diseñar una reforma del sistema educativo, en

la cual deberá considerarse lo que al respecto

contemplan los Acuerdos de Paz, particularmente

el Acuerdo sobre Identidad y Derechos

de los Pueblos Indígenas, numeral III, Derechos

Culturales; literal G, Reforma Educativa, numeral

2”.

La Comisión quedó formalmente instalada el

2 de abril de 1997 y se integró con diez personas:

cinco representantes del Gobierno de la

República y cinco representantes de Organizaciones

Indígenas. Al aceptar el mandato que

le fue confiado, la Comisión estableció como

principios internos de trabajo: la apertura, flexibilidad

y tolerancia, por parte de todos sus

integrantes, con el fin de alcanzar un objetivo

común: establecer las bases para construir un

proyecto educativo nacional propio. Con ese

objetivo, se buscaron transformaciones actitudinales

que implicarán conocer y comprender

mejor al otro y al mundo; respetar y valorar

la riqueza y diversidad cultural del país; y favorecer

el entendimiento mutuo, el diálogo y

la armonía; lo cual significó organizarse bajo

principios de igualdad y equidad.

*This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the World Education Research Association in Guanajuato, Mexico, November 18-22, 2013, and published in part in this blog and others. All Rights Reserved.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Review of Chapter 3, “Capitalism and Crisis in Central America” by Dawn Paley

             The crisis in Central America, particularly in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, has created an international outcry as journalists and civil rights activists have gradually uncovered one of the worst kinds of human suffering. Presumably at peace, the people from these countries are faced with overwhelming injustices, human rights abuses, extreme levels of poverty, and an undignified quality of life. It’s no wonder that thousands have decided to leave their homes and risk everything, even their lives, to make a new home in the United States. Dawn Paley’s book chapter, “Capitalism and Crisis in Central America,” advances the thesis that at the heart of the problem is the historical basis for nation-building, that wars and armed conflicts have resulted in the powerful subjugating of the indigenous, native populations and transforming an entire political, economic, social landscape to their advantage.  The Spaniards’ conquest in the form of colonialism grew at such a fast pace, and as Paley writes, “From the first moments of independence, newly empowered criollo elites implemented political systems based on exclusionary racism and despotism.” (27)

But, the powerful elites from the three countries would not have advanced their racist and violent politics without the assistance of the United States. The strong arm of the military might of the United States was the perfect fit for the powerful, established ruling parties of the countries: they both embraced the common enemy, which was communism, particularly, in regard to the treatment of the indigenous population that were perceived as “communist,” when in fact, all they wanted was to preserve their way of life.  In previous articles of this blog, I described the various armed conflicts in each of the three Northern Triangle countries, some of which exercised the worst kind of human rights abuses as thousand were tortured and killed, including civilians. But, many of the efforts to seek justice against those responsible have been ignored, or weakened. The United States government has promoted a “hands-off” relationship with those seeking to reveal the truth and to hold the guilty accountable for their crimes against humanity. Paley describes the aftermath of the violent conflicts and the efforts to restructure in this way: “Under the close eye of Washington and the United Nations, war criminals were given amnesty, military officials lived large off of the profits of pillage, and to the day those responsible for enabling terror remain active in politics, public life, and economic affairs.” (31)  According to Paley, as neoliberal governance became a dominant force that protected and enabled the powerful elite, and globalized capitalism became the preferred mode of investment, the state shifted toward further denigrating and even, abolishing the freedom and rights of the people, especially the most vulnerable such as the poor and the indigenous population. The gap between the rich and the poor is so great that the two worlds are total strangers to each other.

Although the threat of a communist take-over is no longer valid, the new threat caused by the criminal element in narco-trafficking, is used to justify the U.S. backed militarization and the triggered violence and suppression. The U.S. funding, formerly known as the Merida Initiative and now titled, Central America Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI, has a 50% earmark for use in “policing, military, and counter narcotics.”(34). Paley asserts that although the U.S. government’s program (Alliance for Prosperity) and funding (CARSI) intend to stem the flow of illegal migration from Central America, the reality is that the efforts actually promote the same kinds of policies inherent in neoliberal economies that impose their rules on militarized security tactics, which “have pushed the region to experience the crisis like the unaccompanied minors in 2014.” (34)  The Alliance for Prosperity, which proposes economic expansion and integration, is based on the premises of the Central American-Dominican Republic-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. With a budget of 22 billion for a five-year period, the Alliance for Prosperity proposal is clearly directed as an investment plan for the United States and its investors.

Paley elaborates on how neoliberal policies for purposes of capital gain can affect Central American migrants that desperately travel to the U.S. through Mexico. While the government’s border-free rules may apply for the exchanging of goods and services across the Northern Triangle countries, the opposite awaits the fleeing migrants. The border area between Mexico and Guatemala is destined to be a highly-militarized area, especially under the Plan Frontera Sur program. Already, there’s a high degree of involvement by the Mexican paramilitary organizations, such as Los Zetas, contracted by the Mexican government to control the northerly migrant flow. With the added militarization and policing, migrants face an even dangerous risk: if captured by the formal authorities they may be incarcerated and eventually, deported; but if captured by the paramilitary, migrants may be terrorized, extorted, kidnapped, and/or massacred. (35)

Migration Largely Due to Street Gang Violence and Related Factors

             El Salvador’s gang members number around 60,000, mostly youth, which is staggering by any measure but an extremely serious problem for a country of 6.5 million people. El Salvador has more gang members, especially in MS-13, than do Honduras or Guatemala writes Danielle Mackey for World Politics Review. Most of the gangs’ criminal targets are workers in transportation companies, and the small business and working-class sector; indeed, the higher-class sector enjoys the protection of a strong security force, private and/or funded by the government, to shelter them from any of the gangs’ incursions. The Salvadoran government, with its backing of the powerful economic and social elite has opted for doing as little as possible in order to maintain the status quo, as long as the violent eruptions are contained within the working-class population and away from the elite. What are the options and why doesn’t the government take full control of the street gang violence? There are many questions surrounding the country’s decisions on gang control, starting with the Mano Duro Gang policy.

 The Mano Duro Gang Policy

According to Sonja Wolf in her 2017 book, Mano Duro: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador, in July 2003, then Salvadoran President Francisco Flores launched the highly lauded “Mano Duro” gang policy in response to the dominant elite alliances’ dependence on authoritarianism to maintain order and defend their elite privileges. The powerful elite and the dominant right-wing media cleverly portrayed the challenges to the status quo as a communist ploy that could destroy the institutions that has continuously contributed  to the country’s prosperity. It was the perfect social and political climate that created an overwhelming acceptance of the “iron-fist,” the Mano Duro approach that included the “anti-gang” law allowing officials to arrest anyone based on their pre-conceived profile of what a gang member looks like. The militarized police force, originally created as the PNC (Policia Nacional Civil), a professional, apolitical and respectful of human rights, was ordered to protect the powerful ruling class at the expense of the ordinary citizen. The PNC was installed as part of the 1992 Peace Accords, but as soon as the international monitoring strategies were lifted, the Salvadoran government reverted back to their familiar ways of “owning” the police force. As a result, human rights abuses are on the upswing and the homicide rates among gang members have increased, and to a much lesser extent, among police officers.

The Mano Duro policy was created to bolster the conservative forces united behind the ARENA party prior and leading to the 2004 presidential elections. The right-wing media, clearly aligned with the powerful elite, worked hand-in-hand with the ARENA party in spreading unsubstantiated fear over the gangs and their threat to Salvadoran society. According to Wolf, due to its ineffectiveness, the Mano Duro policy “may have contributed to a greater threat to society than the gangs themselves.”

Efforts to Address the Street Gang Problem

In her book, Sonja Wolf elaborates on her research that studied the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their efforts to eradicate the problems associated with gang activity. Her data revealed the inexorable links between the gangs and society, claiming that “NGOs’ efforts were inadequate given the magnitude of the problem.” Also, the political system itself “needs to become the object of reform.”  Even so, several key players have worked on alternative gang control strategies and comprehensive plans, although the results have yet to prove unequivocally the ones that have been successful and sustainable.

One of the NGO that worked intensively to create alternative forms of gang control was the Foundation for Applied Legal Studies (la Fundación de estudios para la aplicación del derecho), or FESPAD. Founded in 1988 for the purpose of defending human rights and the rule of law, FESPAD and to a great extent, the Center for Criminal Studies of El Salvador (Centro de estudios penales de El Salvador) or CEPES, worked toward an alternative gang control other than Mano Duro. Law students from the university studied the legal and constitutional rights that were applicable to gang control with Professor Alberto M. Binder, an Argentinean lawyer and expert in Criminal Procedural Law. In turn, the students worked with FESPAD to develop an alternative to gang control, train community leaders, and promote the access to justice by affected communities. The book on the Salvadoran constitution, “La constitución explicada,” sold over 50,000 copies. The NGO focused its work on providing legal aid to victims, investigating and documenting human rights violations, and in assessing relevant policies in regard to how they are administered within a legal and political perspective.

        The 2012 Gang Truce.  Under the FMNL government of President Mauricio Funes, and in response to escalation of gang violence and its effects on Salvadoran life and society, a truce was brokered between gangs, primarily MS-13 and Calle Dieciocho. The government called on the street gangs to reduce the murders, curtail violence against women, eliminate the school-based street gang activity, and stop targeting the youth for forced recruitment. The gangs also had their demands: an end to police abuse, the repeal of the anti-gang law (where anyone “looking” like a gang member can be arrested), improvements in prison life, and educational and job opportunities. But, after a couple of years, the truce demands were totally lost and it was considered a failure. In fact, it appears that the entire effort was fruitless, and worst, it produced even graver consequences. The murders declined from a daily average of 14 to five.  But in a closer scrutiny, the discovery of clandestine graves revealed that the gangs didn’t follow the demands, and neither had the police authorities. The gangs maintained their control over their “territories,” continuing their operations as usual with forced displacements, extortions, etc. Sonja Wolf’s research reveals that the truce served to highlight the political power in the hands of the gang leadership and that the government is unable to control gang violence. Other critics pointed out that the truce’s failure could have been avoided if factors of governmental support had been a part of it, such as sustainable social and economic opportunities.

Instead, the murder rate peaked in 2015, and manodurismo continued in full force. The government took action by transferring and isolating gang members to quash their social networks and in deploying army elite battalions to battle with gangs, and as expected, soldiers were directly engaged in extrajudicial killings of gang members.

        Alternative gang control proposals have been developed and presented but due to their lack of acceptance and support by the powerful elite, they have not gained the necessary popularity among the greater Salvadoran society. Current president, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, initiated an open dialog with different groups, and thus, certain organizations emerged, such as the National Council of Citizen Security and Coexistence (Consejo Nacional de seguridad ciudadano y convivencia). According to Sonja Wolf, the Plan El Salvador Seguro, (PESS), or the Plan for a Safe Salvador, proposes that the government make assertive efforts to do the following: to recover public spaces, to strengthen municipalities’ efforts to prevent crime and violence, create gun-free zones, promote youth employment, and expand community policing. Additionally, lawmakers passed a law that is meant to facilitate the integration of ex-gang members into mainstream society. The law called, Special Law of the Reinsertion of Gang Members and the Prevention of Individuals at Risk, offers scholarships, jobs, drug treatments, and housing credits. However, the presence of specific issues prevents the measures and strategies to become successful. In the case of the Plan for a Safe Salvador, the lack of funds restricts the implementation of what seem to be excellent ideas. And, for gang members to be recipients of the Special Law, they are required to leave their gang life, and risk being “pesetas,” or traitors, and being killed by the gang members.

The need for gang prevention and rehabilitation strategies have been considered, and programs such as Polígono, directed by Father Moratalla, a Spanish Salisian priest, are perceived as highly important for gang control. Sonja Wolf includes discussion about the residential, prevention and rehabilitation efforts by Polígono, based on the preventive system of Don Bosco whose premises include reason, religion, and loving-kindness. But, again, lack of support and funding have blocked the long-term success of these programs.

Law enforcement has been under fire to change their tactics from an authoritative and suppressive force bent on human rights abuses to a policing organization that uses intelligence such as relevant data that target security problems in a hierarchy from the most serious to less, and to emphasizing crime prevention.

A moderate approach to solving the gang control problem includes strategies that encompass aspects from the various possibilities: a policing strategy that respects the human rights of gang members and uses to a great extent intelligence in their investigations, prevention and rehabilitation programs, and community education and participation. But, there is also wide agreement over the need for the Salvadoran government to take a greater responsibility for the gang control, and along with that, transparency and accountability.

The fact that efforts to gang control by the government have resulted in mild to complete failure leads critics to consider the real reason why the problems persist, that the powerful elite and its pernicious right-wing media prefer the Mano Duro approach which they perceive as easier and less costly. In essence, there are sufficient proposals and plans to address the gang control problem, but Salvadorans in power lack the political will to make the needed changes.

        Operation Check. In a recent article (2018), “Killers on a Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador” authors Oscar Martínez, Efren Lemus, Carlos Martínez, and Deborah Sontag (see El Faro,) write about the latest strategy of dealing with gang control. Their focus is on collecting information about the gangs’ dealings for the purpose of eventually capturing the “the big fish” of the gang organizations and then, publicizing their crimes, which they expect will reveal how they have enriched themselves while their “soldiers” recover only a pittance of what they bring back to their jefe. But, the gangs have rules and one of them is that the gang leaders will not overly enrich themselves, and they’re responsible to distribute their proceeds in dutiful ways such as to their family members and for special gifts to the “homies” in jail cells. So, needless to say their efforts have yielded little rewards, while the public learns about their embarrassing results as they report the small amount of illicit funds that they have recovered from their “Operation Check.” Their attempts to shed a negative light on gangs as if they are powerful narco-traffickers like the notorious Zetas, and then, win favor from the Mano Duro proponents were baseless from the outset.

 

 

 

 

With the advent of new immigration policies, the agencies in charge of the implementation of the President’s Border Security Enforcement Improvement Plan have their orders in place. The new guidelines, which extend and expand their work at the US border subsequently increases their responsibilities that then, substantiate their claim for the hiring of more border agents. Vetting the incoming asylum seekers to a “greater” extent and making preliminary decisions about the authenticity and legitimacy of “credible fear” interview information, which had been the purview of asylum officials, places an immense burden on the agents. Furthermore, immigration courts have amassed a huge amount of cases that can’t be processed in a timely manner without hiring more immigration judges. Most asylum cases take anywhere from two to five years to finally reach their court proceedings.

In light of the substantial lack of resources, the Administration’s approach to conduct their policy changes is to take a hardline approach. The following paragraph succinctly refers to the Central American mothers and their children who have heretofore believed that they can find refuge in the United States, away from the dangerous and deadly environments in their home countries: (See Homeland Security document, page 7:

     Accordingly, the Director of ICE and the Commissioner of CBP shall ensure the proper enforcement of our immigration laws against any individual who-directly or indirectly- facilitates the illegal smuggling or trafficking of an alien child into the United States. In appropriate cases, taking into account the risk of harm to the child from the specific smuggling or trafficking activity that the individual facilitated and other factors relevant to the individual’s culpability and the child’s welfare, proper enforcement includes (but is not limited to) placing any such individual who is a removable alien into removal proceedings, or referring the individual for criminal prosecution.

Also, please see WOLA’s BEYOND THE WALL CAMPAIGN

Perhaps, some of the border crossers can be successful in their pursuit of claiming asylum.

    However, according to the new guidelines, even parents that accompany their young children can be arrested and charged with an illegal smuggling activity.

Displacement Due to Criminal Violence and Related Factors
     Millions of people around the globe are forced to leave their homes due to conflict and/or general violence which place them at great risk for their lives. In the Americas, countries which have been surveyed for the surge of displacement are the following: (approximate numbers)
Mexico – 281, 400

Guatemala – 248, 500

El Salvador – 288, 900

Honduras – 29, 400

Colombia – 6, 044, 200

Peru – 150, 000

The reasons for internal displacement varies according to each country, and although the affected populations were forced out of their homes, some people became “refugees” and “asylum seekers.” Some of the internally displaced people become “protracted”, that is, they would return but later had to again leave for fear of their lives. Internally displaced people from the Northern Triangle countries in Central America sought refuge in nearby countries such as Costa Rica and Nicaragua. But, most set out to find a new home in the United States, preferably with family members or close friends that had settled there. (See Global Overview 2015: PeopleInternally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, page 16)

From the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras approximately 714,000 people have been displaced and although the data do not breakdown the numbers, there is considerable speculation that most displacements are due to criminal activity, and individuals that can find the means by which to migrate to the United States will do so.

Explaining the “why” and “how” of displaced people from Central America is difficult, filled with complexity that involves historical nuances as well as compulsively natured factors. (See “SnapShot”). Decisions to leave their homes to find a new beginning are unequivocally complex and extremely stressful, but in the broader context, given that the United States is a country where freedom abounds and the opportunities for a better quality of life is eminent, people make the decision accordingly.

Solving the Problems Include Very Difficult Changes

     The infrastructure of the Northern Triangle Countries has been transformed dramatically due to the gangs’ criminal behavior, which carry out crimes such as extortions, murders, and kidnappings in similar ways. The gangs from Honduras label their extortion moneys as “impuestos de guerra” as if to legitimize their crime within a context of war. Criminal gangs from El Salvador use the label “renta” which has an anglicized comparability to a similar linguistic transfer used in the US among Spanish speakers.

The funds extracted through criminal means have become a strong aspect of the countries’ economies. In El Salvador, approximately $390 million results from various extortions and related criminal activities; in Honduras, criminals exhort $200 million and in Guatemala, $61 million.  (See La Prensa). and WOLA, Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas.)
Thus, a huge amount of “dirty” money circulates throughout each country’s economy and as in most economies where illegal funds become readily available, white collar crimes such as money laundering are often an integral part of the picture.
The US has committed to providing aid to the three countries, and in accordance to this kind of outreach, certain stipulations or provisions are attached to the funds. Approximately, $750 million was allocated in 2016 while $743.6 million is expected to be approved for 2017. The funds are earmarked for the design and implementation of projects and activities that are specifically related to the “root causes” of the problems.

The intentions to address the problems seem adequate and appropriate, such as 1) community-based programs for youth and to assist former gang members to become better integrated into the mainstream society and to help children that have suffered violence; 2) to support programs for the purpose of enhancing transparency and accountability so as to combat corruption and provide more access for citizens to participate in the democratic process; 3) a focus on strengthening civilian law and make appropriate institutions more accountable and transparent; 4) focus on job training and education efforts; and 5) ensure that community members are consulted and involved in the evaluation of the funded programs.

However, the context by which to incorporate the funded efforts may not be appropriately strong and stable enough to ensure that the efforts are not just mere gestures to show the US and the citizens that they are sincere and determined to make the right changes. Perhaps, the barriers to change are too integral and permanent to eliminate and replace with the kind of activities that will result in sustainable change. The implementation of the proposed projects and all related activities need the careful and precise focus on ensuring their intended success.

Please see article for related information: Trump’s Cruel Choice: Who Gets to Stay.